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ADD CTBT

APP adds: The foreign minister said that Pakistan would retain the option to conduct a nuclear test, if another country did so, even after signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

He said: "If another country conducts tests, Pakistan's option to do the same remains open, irrespective of signing or not signing the CTBT. Nothing in the treaty imposes unilateral obligations on a state that has signed the treaty," he said.

Chief Executive Gen Pervez Musharraf has reaffirmed Pakistan's commitment to restraint and responsibility, and his government is determined to maintain a robust and credible deterrent capability, Sattar said.

He said: "The government is in no hurry to make a decision, let alone sign the treaty.

"The final decision will not be made unless an informed consensus emerges as to what will best serve the interest of our country".

"We want the people to understand the treaty and deliberate on the merits of signing or not signing the treaty."

He said: "Not signing the treaty has identifiable costs but not benefits. Signing the CTBT has no identifiable costs even though the benefits, too, are more intangible than concrete. A sound policy should keep Pakistan in the mainstream rather than push us to the fringe, liable to international isolation."

He said he hoped the deliberations of the experts participating in the seminar would lead to a judgement that would best advance the national interests.

Sattar said the fear that signing the CTBT would require a roll-back of Pakistan's nuclear programme was yet another manifestation of failure to understand the treaty.

"CTBT does not in any way affect Pakistan's right to maintain or enhance our nuclear stockpile. It has no relevance to fissile material production," he added.

The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty would be entirely separate from CTBT. For the present, FMCT is only an item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Substantive negotiations on it have not yet begun. When they do, all CD members will have an opportunity to contribute to its evolution, said the foreign minister.

He recapitulated important provisions of the CTBT and presented his analysis.

Article I defines the basic obligations. Each state party would undertake neither to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion not to cause, encourage or participate in carrying out any such explosion.

Article IV deals with verification of compliance with the CTBT and the system of monitoring. The treaty provides that these activities shall be based on objective information, limited to the purpose of the treaty, and carried out with full respect for the sovereignty of state parties.

Article IX provides for right of withdrawal after CTBT has entered into force. A state party can renounce the treaty if it decides that an extraordinary events have jeopardised its "supreme interests."

The foreign minister said Article XIV is crucial to Pakistan's historic concern regarding discrimination. It provides that CTBT will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of instruments of ratification by 44 designated states. The list includes all states that possess nuclear weapons or have nuclear reactors.

He said an explicit requirement under Article XII is an act distinct and separate from signing a treaty. A State may sign but then delay or even refuse ratification. So far 41 designated states have signed the treaty and 26 have ratified it. The United States Senate has rejected ratification. The prospects of the treaty's entry into force seem uncertain, therefore.

Sattar said it does not matter which state signs first and which last, which ratifies first and which last. Only after the 44 the state has ratified it will the CTBT come into force.